

Annexes to the Resolution The coordination of collective bargaining 2007

Annex 1

PRECARIOUS WORK IN EUROPE: ANNEX TO THE 2007 ETUC RESOLUTION ON THE COORDINATION OF COLLECTIV BARGAINING

Introduction

Beginning 2006, the ETUC addressed a questionnaire to the members of its collective bargaining committee, requesting information on the situation of precarious work in the different countries. The country overview in this report is based on the replies to this questionnaire. In addition, information from a study done by IRES-France has been used to complete the picture where necessary¹.

CHAPTER I: PRECARIOUS WORK: FACTS, CONSEQUENCES, CAUSES AND STRATEGIES

Excessive flexibility: Spreading throughout Europe

6 million temporary workers in Spain, 5 million vulnerable workers in the UK at risk being denied their employment rights, almost 3 million 'false' self-employed in Italy working for one single employer, 6 million workers in Germany in 'mini-jobs' gaining a maximum of only 400 euro per month, 80% of all new hiring in France on a fixed-term basis.

In the EU-25 as a whole, some 30 million workers (14.5%) are on a fixed-term contract in 2005, up from 2000 when the number of fixed-term workers was 25 million (12.6%). 37 million workers are now working part-time (up from 32 million in 2005), with one fifth of them declaring they are involuntary part time workers, a share that is rapidly increasing (from 15% in 2002 to 20% in 2005). Moreover, these figures are averages, hiding the fact that weaker groups (women, young workers, older workers, migrants) bear the blunt of atypical contracts and work practices.

These figures are alarming. They call into question the much heard claim that Social Europe is doing well, implying that social policy and worker rights can be put in the 'freezer'. They also refute the argument that European labour markets are rigid and inflexible'. If anything they show that there are situations of 'excessive flexibility' in European labour

¹ IRES, Les emplois précaires, enjeu de représentation syndicale ? Chronique internationale de l'IRES, no 97, novembre 2005.
ETUC/ SC107/JM/cd-14/09/2006

markets which need to be tackled urgently if Europe is to improve both its social as its economic outcomes.

Precarious work practice comes at a high price

Precarious work has serious consequences for workers involved as well as for the economy as a whole. Excessive worker flexibility:

- Makes employers think of employees as a commodity that can easily be dispensed with in case of business problems. As a result, employers will not be inclined to invest in training their workforce. There are indeed strong empirical indications pointing to this: Since 2000, and together with rising precariousness in European labour markets, there has been a significant fall in the share of workers having received training from their employers, falling from 30.6% in 2000 to 27.3% in 2005, with the average number of training days falling as well (14.3 in 2000, 11.4 in 2005). In particular, the position of temporary agency workers is quite dramatic: Only 18% of these workers receive employer supported training (Source: Fourth Working Conditions Survey).
- Acts like a 'bad job' trap. Upward mobility from precarious jobs is low, which reflects the limited access of employer supported training, as well as the barriers for flexible workers to engage themselves in lifelong learning because of low wages, long working hours and hierarchical work relations which work to demotivate workers to increase their skills. Several studies indeed confirm this low mobility out of atypical jobs.
- Holds back innovation at the workplace: Flexible workers will show not much attachment to the firm and motivation to cooperate in introducing innovation in the workplace since increased productivity may directly cost them their job.
- Provides business with the wrong incentives to address competitive challenges. If business is offered the 'easy way out' (firing workers, cutting wages, working longer unpaid hours), they will tend to do so, and this at the expense of what is a really sustainable solution to competitiveness (product and work place innovation and productivity).

The (economic) perversity of precarious work is probably nowhere better illustrated than in the case of Italy, where the previous Berlusconi government introduced a wide variety of work contracts allowing employers to destabilise basic worker rights (Biagi labour law reform). At the same time the pace of hourly labour productivity increase has substantially fallen. Productivity has actually started declining in absolute terms over the last couple of years, thereby seriously damaging Italian cost competitiveness and this despite moderate nominal wage increases.

The real causes of precariousness

One peculiar explanation of the causes of precarious work is advanced by business in particular and is claiming that regular workers are too heavily protected insiders so that employers have no other choice than to reflect the full burden of global competition and flexibility on outsiders and new or weaker categories of workers.

However, the country cases reported in chapter II show that such a view is turning the discussion upside down. What business is actually doing is to make use and exploit the loopholes that exist in European legislation, national labour laws, taxation systems and collective bargaining practice:

- If no limits are set to fixed-term work, employers will maximize the use of these contracts, thereby preventing workers to enter open-ended contracts. In some countries, because of lack of adequate regulation, workers are kept for years and years on a temporary basis by the same employer for the same job. Or the same worker is offered the same job through 10 or 15 temporary work contracts over a period of one year!
- In many cases, tax and social security contribution systems organise and promote 'bad' employer behaviour. Employers offering temporary jobs, false-self employment 'contracts' or jobs paying minimum and poverty wages are being rewarded by having to pay lower taxes, lower social security contributions or even receiving employment subsidies in the context of 'active labour market policies'.

Governments and business motivate such schemes by arguing that these 'exceptions' are necessary to correct for lower productivity and skills levels of certain groups of workers. In practice however, the use of such schemes has become so widespread that the 'exception has become the rule': Workers that are sufficiently productive and sufficiently skilled are engaged through (subsidized) precarious work statutes which are then used to destroy regular jobs:

One in three (33!) of workers in the EU-25 indicate that their duties are below their skills and that they could perform more demanding tasks (Source: Fourth European Working Conditions Survey). Workers engaged in low wage jobs are often trained workers. In Germany for example, two thirds of workers in a low wage job have ended a professional training.

Experience in Germany (1-euro jobs), France (CNE-contract), Italy ('parasubordinare') learns that these exceptional schemes do not produce much net additional jobs. What happens is that regular jobs are substituted for by these new but insecure job schemes.

Some principles for a possible strategy for trade unions in Europe

A strategy of European trade unions should start from the principle that a modern labour market has no room for precarious work. Taking inspiration from the country overview (chapter II), a number of interesting and 'good practice' approaches can be highlighted. These are based on the following principles:

- Ending the situation of rewarding 'bad' employment practices over the board. 'Small job' schemes should be carefully designed, well targeted and temporary schemes with a focus on upwards transition of workers.
- Promoting 'good' employer behaviour by offering fiscal/parafiscal incentives to those employers who do not resort to precarious work practices.
- Prioritising the non-respect or the poor transformation of the European social acquis (for example directive on fixed term work).
- Addressing gaps in labour law/collective bargaining practice, both at the European level as at the national level.
- Building systems of coordinated bargaining which 'internalize' the need to integrate groups of vulnerable workers, in particular through collective bargaining agreements which make sure all groups of workers (including unemployed at risk) have access to training and lifelong learning.
- Implement a macro-economic strategy combining stability oriented age formation and demand and growth supportive fiscal and monetary policies in order to create more jobs so that skilled workers can flow into productive jobs, thereby making decent jobs available for relatively disadvantaged workers ('inverse ladder4 effects).

CHAPTER II: COUNTRY OVERVIEW²

AUSTRIA

Many work contracts, mostly for workers under the age of 30, contain 'flexibility' clauses. These clauses transform wages into 'all-in' wages without overtime payment; give the employer the power to decide unilaterally on flexible hour schemes as well as the power to extract re-payment of training costs when the worker is leaving the job. On average, 18% of overtime is not being paid. A quarter of a million of workers are on atypical contracts, with three quarters of them being women. Many of these workers face a high risk of poverty.

BELGIUM

Main problems with precarious work

² * marks information based on Ires study

False independent workers are identified as a main problem. Although Belgian law or/and collective bargaining practice provides a framework to control the excesses of flexibility, there is no solution to the problem of so-called 'autonomous workers' in Belgium. This is a problem in particular when employers use workers from Central and Eastern Europe as so-called self employed, thereby avoiding to pay collectively agreed wages or even the statutory minimum wage as stipulated in the posted-workers directive.

There exists a well-defined framework for temporary agency work obliging equal pay and limiting the use of temporary workers to particular and exceptional situations. However, there is pressure from business to extend the use of temporary work and use it in general as a way to enter the labour market.

Interesting practice to control for excessive flexibility

Employer abuse of using chains of fixed-term contracts are controlled for by labour law: There is a maximum of 4 successive fixed-term contracts over 2 years with the same employer. After that, the fixed-term contract is regarded as an open-ended contract.

Belgium labour law also blocks very small part time. A labour contract needs to provide at least one third of the weekly hours worked by a full timer. In practice this means labour contracts not less than 13 hours a week. This avoids abuse of employers writing out zero or two hour contracts and thereby keeping workers in a very dependant and weak position. On the other hand, it does not prevent employers from shifting the burden of fluctuations in business on to workers from the moment the employee has reached its minimum of 13 hours a week. A too standard practice is also to pay all hours worked over the minimum of 13 hours unofficially, thereby undermining government revenue and denying their workers with full access to social benefits.

NETHERLANDS*

In the Netherlands, the share of flexible workers (defined as fixed term contracts under one year and on-call contracts) has fallen from 10.3% in 1998 to 6.6% (460.000 workers) in 2003. On call workers take up 22% of this number, so representing around 1.3% of all workers. A number of them are 15-24 year olds combining studies with work.

The liberalisation of the temporary agency sector has led to some abuses. One in four temps' appears to be working for agencies not paying social security contributions or not paying collectively agreed wages.

Labour law is limiting fixed term contracts to a maximum of 3 contracts over a maximum of 36 months, after which the contract becomes open-

ended. However, collective agreements can and are deviating from this by specifying more contract renewals and/or a longer period than 36 months.

Interesting practices

A substantial reduction of on-call workers has been achieved by installing minimum work sessions of 3 hours (up to 15 hours a week), by increasing contractual working hours to average number of hours worked over the past three months. Many of these on-call workers have received a part-time work contract instead.

Another measure is tackling the false self-employed workers by transforming each regular working relationship of 20 weekly hours over at least three months into a regular working contract.

Collective bargaining agreements, followed by the 'flex-wet' have installed a right for workers to request a reduction in working time as well as a right to reverse their previous choice.

Like the UK, the Netherlands have a high rate of part-time workers. However, unlike the UK, and thanks to the 'equivalent rights' approach, part-time work is not a synonym for precariousness.

Some trade unions (media, construction, services) have organised the self-employed and are seeking to include fixed minimum rates of compensation for the self employed in collective bargaining agreements.

GERMANY

Main problems with precarious work

Part time employment is increasing rapidly, from 19,4% of all workers to 14,2%. Behind this is the increase of the so called mini jobs (monthly income limited to 400 euro's a month, working time however is not limited). Some 6 million people are now holding such a mini-job (for 1,4 million workers this is a second job). Half of them is gaining less than 8 euro an hour.

Temporary agency work is used by employers to undermine the bargaining position of trade unions: Wage demands considered too high (or wage concessions that employers consider too low) are sanctioned by resorting to temps'. Temps' are paid very low wages, sometimes as low as 5 euro an hour. In principle, German labour law imposes the principle of equal pay for equal work. In practice however, competition between trade unions has led to collective bargaining agreements using the possibility of deviating from the equal pay principle.

Germany has a large low wage sector. 2,5 million (full-time) workers are on poverty wages (below 50% of the median wage), with 64% of these

workers having a degree or a professional training. The low wage sector also constitutes a trap: Even after five years, only one third of workers is able to escape from low wage employment to find a better paid job. This is the lowest upward mobility in Europe.

There exists a generation of 'trainees for free': 40% of them receive no pay.

Labour market policy is much behind this trend of more precarious work in Germany. Cuts in unemployment benefit systems, together with 'active' labour market policies force workers to take up jobs paying 30% below collective bargained wage agreements, as well as mini-jobs and 1-euro jobs drive workers into the sector of low paid, precarious jobs.

FRANCE

Main problems with precarious work

The majority of new hirings (80%!) is done through fixed term contracts, with especially youngsters being hit by this. This overdependence on fixed term contracts creates problems with social rights such as holiday pay, sickness leave, maternity,....).

Interesting practice to control for excessive flexibility

Temporary agency workers are known to have much less access to training. In France, a special levy is charged on temporary work agencies and these revenues are then used to provide temporary agency workers with training.

ITALY*

One of the drivers of Italian labour market reform introducing precarious work has been the European economic policy framework: With fiscal policy constrained by the Maastricht regime and with a devaluation of the national currency no longer possible in the monetary union, 'labour' is seen as the only factor of adjustment by policy makers.

As a result, and especially under the Berlusconi government (see Biagi law) Italy has indeed introduced a wide 'variety' of labour contracts, allowing business to force workers into insecure working conditions:

- 'Collaboration' contracts have formalised the so-called 'parasubordinare' a category between the statute of regular workers and self-employed. In many cases, these workers are doing the same job as regular workers but without (full) access to social security rights. In 1995, these 'collaboration contracts' have been made 'official' by charging social security

contributions which are however substantially lower than the contributions to be paid on regular workers. The effect is that the number of 'parsubordinare' has been tripled from 1 million workers (1996) to 3 million workers (2004). A quarter of these workers are employed by the public sector. Ninety (!) percent of them are working for a single employer.

Self employed workers take up 27% of total employment in Italy, a figure that is substantially higher than in the rest of Europe

- The incidence of fixed term workers, taking up 12,3% of total employment, is similar to the European average. However, half of all new hirings are done through fixed term contracts and the share of fixed terms in total employment has been rising rapidly from 7,4% in 1995 and 10% in 2000.
- 'Insertion contracts' allow workers aged 18 to 29(!) years, long term unemployed between the age of 29 and 32 years, older unemployed over 50 years and female workers(!) in almost all regions to be hired at a wage level that is two categories lower than the level corresponding with the qualifications necessary for the job. The counterpart of employers providing training to these workers is practically absent.
- 'On call' contracts allow the employer to call upon the worker in function of business activity. If workers have to be permanently available, a special compensation is paid. However, no social security contributions are to be paid on this availability fee.
- Job-sharing: A contract through which two employees share the work. Dismissing one worker automatically dismisses the other worker, a modality which is highly problematic when the two workers in question are a couple.
- Part-time work has been increasing rapidly as well from 8,4% in 2000 to 12,8% in 2005. Reductions in social security contributions have been specifically targeted to promote employers who hire workers on a part-time basis, in particular young, female and older workers. The 2003 Biagi law also weakened the role and possibilities of trade unions to limit and negotiate the introduction of part time work in the enterprises.

Interesting practice

Italian trade unions try to negotiate collective agreements with employers which 'stabilize' and re-regulate the use of these forms of work. For example, in 2003, an agreement was signed for the sector of call centers

stipulating that the share of 'parasubordinare' workers should be gradually reduced from 80%(!) to 40%.

The new Prodi government is keen on ending the employers' abuse of this chaos of work contracts. A first offensive against the deregulation of the Italian labour market is the draft 2007 budget which includes a reduction in taxes on labour. The modalities of this tax cut are such that open ended contracts are advantaged over other forms of contracts. At the same time, the social contribution advantage that the statute of 'parasubordinare' enjoyed is being reduced; this in turn provides the financial room to cut the overall tax wedge on labour. In this way, the Italian government is rewarding 'good' employer behaviour and having 'bad' employers pay the cost of the flexibility they extract from workers. A second initiative will start beginning next year, with the opening of a tri-partite negotiation aiming to address the system of 'parasubordinare' and to fight informal labour.

SPAIN

Main problems with precarious work

Spain is the unfortunate 'champion' of temporary contracts. About one third of all workers have a fixed term contract, a share that has not gone down much despite the good economic performance of the Spanish economy which has more than halved unemployment from a level of 20% to 8% at present. In absolute figures, this concerns 5 million workers.

One consequence of the high incidence of fixed term work is that many fixed term workers have difficult access to unemployment benefits, since such access is restricted to workers with a minimal period of social security contributions of 12 months. Indeed, two thirds of fixed term contracts are contracts of 6 months duration or less.

The big rise in the share of fixed term work in the second half of the eighties is to attributed to active labour market policies, targeting a certain public (long term unemployed, female work force,...), and providing substantial tax cuts and tax advantages for employers taking on such workers on a temporary basis. In 1992 for example, half of temporary contracts were concluded in the context of such employment policies. In return, the fact that the relative incidence of temporary work did not really fall over the recent period of growth is to be found, again, in the Maastricht regime of fiscal policy. To consolidate public finances, only a quarter of vacant jobs in the public sector are being filled up with regular working contracts, with the rest of open places going to temporary work contracts.

Interesting practice

In May 2006, social partners and government concluded a social agreement with the intention of tackling the problem of precarious work. The agreement contains the following measures:

- A limit to temporary work: After more than 24 months of fixed-term contracts in the same enterprise and for the same job over a reference period of 30 months, the contract is converted into an open ended contract.
- Employer bonuses (from 850 to 3200 euro) to be paid annually when target groups (women, youngsters, long term unemployed...) are offered an open-ended contract.
- Employer social security contributions are being cut, with a 5,5% contribution for open ended contracts and a 6,7% contribution for fixed term contracts.
- Involvement of social partners in Labour inspection services to follow up the illegal use of temporary contracts in firms and sectors where the share of fixed term workers is particularly large.

As a result of these policies, hundred thousands of temporary contracts are in the process of being transformed into open ended contracts before the end of this year.

Another interesting policy measure is the new legal statute for autonomous workers that are in the making. If at least 75% of total income of a self-employed worker is provided for by one single client, then the worker gets additional protection: A written contract then becomes obligatory and the rate of compensation is governed by 'agreements of professional interest'. These agreements are negotiated between employer and user associations on the one hand and autonomous workers' associations (with links to the trade union movement) on the other hand. Labour courts are authorised to intervene in case of conflicts or non-respect of the agreements.

UNITED KINGDOM

Main problems with precarious work

The UK has a high share of part-time workers. Unlike the Netherlands, UK part time workers have no or reduced access to essential social rights (pensions, maternity, unemployment benefits).

Low pay is widespread in the UK: Over 20 (28)% of UK population has an income lower than 60 (50)% of median income and the probability of transiting from a low paid job into a better paid one is one of the lowest in the European Union.

Temporary work is less widespread in the UK (around 6%) than in the rest of the EU. But at the same time temporary workers receive no protection so that their pay is on average some 17% lower compared to workers with open ended contracts. Access to additional pension schemes, sickness and holiday entitlements is also rather unlikely if one is a temporary agency

worker in the UK. Even over the run of their full career, workers who once occupied a temporary job, earn on average a wage that is 12% (8,8%) lower for men (women).

This structure of part time, temporary contracts, results in one third of workers not having sickness leave rights. (Half of UK firms do not pay anything during the first three days of sickness).Lack of decent legal protection or organised trade unions at work is resulting in one in five workers or about 6 million workers in total being vulnerable to abuse from their employers in the UK.

Interesting practice to control for excessive flexibility

Clear regulation and criteria on distinguishing dependant workers from self-employed workers.

Introduction of a statutory minimum wage in 1999.

Limiting of trial period during which unfair dismissal cannot be contested by the worker from 24 to 12 months.

POLAND

Main problems with precarious work

The share of fixed term workers has risen enormously, from 4% in 1999 to 26% in 2005. 60% of youngsters are on fixed term contracts. There is a rapid growth in temporary agency work as well. A-typical workers such as these are excluded from training.

One tenth of the workforce is self-employed, with many of these depending on one single 'employer', especially in the health and social care sectors.

SLOVAKIA

Main problems with precarious work

The labour code allows the chaining of fixed term contracts over three years. Moreover, the labour law allows this over an indefinite time span 'if there are reasons to do so', which is like giving a blanc cheque to employers willing to abuse the situation. For certain workers (nurses, care services, workers in small enterprises) the law does not set any limit. In Slovakia, a fixed-term contract can be ended immediately.

Slovakian labour law also allows 'trading licences', thereby creating 'false independants'. Employees performing identical work in the same work place are then paid different compensation and have unequal access to social security.

Part time workers have a reduced dismissal notice of two weeks instead of two months. Conversion into full time contracts rarely takes place.

Interesting practice

To increase the respect of labour laws, government is considering higher fines, which are now limited to an average of 1 euro per case.

HUNGARY

There is general practice to employ workers as a small/semi entrepreneur. Ongoing legislation tries to make the distinction between workers and entrepreneurs clear. Recent legislation also forces firms that are borrowing workers from other firms to pay an equal wage.

SLOVENIA

Number of a-typical workers (project workers, workers posted to another employer) is rising. For workers involved, this creates uncertainty, much less attachment to the company so less innovation. These workers also have less access to credit and loans.

ESTONIA

Much sickness related absence from work has to do with bad and unhealthy working week of sickness to firms themselves.

NORWAY

Main problems with precarious work

One tenth of workers are in temporary employment, mostly youngsters. Temps' are excluded from pension schemes and their high turnover results in employers showing no interest in upgrading their skills. There are also problems with access to housing loans.

One fifth of workers is in part time. Employers abuse part time work to avoid contributing to pension arrangements.

Interesting practice The working environment act limits the use of temporary jobs to exceptional cases but the follow up of this principle is low in services sectors where trade union density is limited.

SWEDEN*

Main problems with precarious work

Since 1997 the use of fixed term contracts is no longer limited to certain specified cases (such as for example a temporary increase in activity or replacing permanent workers that are on leave or on sabbatical). However, workers can not be hired on a fixed term basis for more than 12 months over a period of three years while there's also a maximum of five persons per enterprise. Collective bargaining contracts can deviate from these rules. A contested reform in 2000 allowed local bargaining to agree upon these deviations, whereas before 2000, this deviation could only be done through centralised bargaining. Fixed term work increased from 14,4% in 1996 to 16% in 2000.

Another even more striking development concerns the increase in part time work since 2000, from 19,4% of all workers to 24,7% in 2005. Behind these figures hides, amongst other things, the problem that employers are abusing part-time work contracts by combining these with practices of 'on-call' work.

Annex 2

Exemples de textes à caractère transnational négociés au niveau de l'entreprise

Entreprise	Date	Dénomination	Domaine
Danone	1988	Avis commun	Principes et programme du travail commun
	1989	Projet	Information économique et sociale
	1989	Programme d'action	Egalité hommes femmes
	1992	Accord cadre	Formation
	1994	Déclaration commune	Droits syndicaux
	1997	Avis commun	Gestion des modifications d'activité (formation, reclassement, consultation, droit syndical)
	2001	Accord	Mesures sociales en cas de restructuration
Accor	1995	Accord	Droits sociaux fondamentaux
ENI	1996	Accord	Santé & Sécurité
	2002	Accord	RSE. dialogue social
Vivendi	1996	Déclaration commune	Droits sociaux fondamentaux
	1999	Charte	Sécurité au travail
Ikea	1998	Code de conduite	Droits sociaux fondamentaux
Suez	1998	Charte sociale internationale	Droits fondamentaux principes de la GRH
	2002	Charte	Santé & sécurité
	1998 1999 2001	Code de conduite Code de conduite Principes Accord	Fumeurs /non- fumeurs Introduction de l'euro Protection des données
Deutsche Bank	1999	Position commune	Nouvelles structures, sécurité d'emploi et employabilité
Ford	2000	Accord	Cession de Visteon: statut des salariés, représentation et contrats de Visteon
	2000	Accord	Joint Venture CFT: maintien de contrats Ford, investissements
	2003	Accord cadre	Droits sociaux et RSE
	2004	Accord	Restructuration IOS: maintien emploi, investissements, employabilité
General Motors	2000	Accord cadre	Conséquences de l'alliance GM/Fiat sur le statut des salariés et la représentation
	2001	Accord cadre	Restructurations en cours
	2001	Accord cadre	Restructuration d'Opel
	2002	Accord	RSE
	2004	Cadre	Restructuration européenne
Faber Castell	2000	Accord cadre	Droits sociaux fondamentaux
		Avis commun	Mobilité

Air France		Avis commun	Position du personnel commercial
	2001	Charte sociale	Droits fondamentaux, politique RH
Freudenberg:	2000	Accord mondial	Droits fondamentaux, Santé & sécurité
Hochtief	2000	Code de conduite	RSE
Carrefour	2001	Accord	Droits fondamentaux
Club Méditerranée	2001	Déclaration commune	Sous-traitance
	2004	Accord	Droits fondamentaux et mobilité Europe & Afrique

Entreprise	Date	Dénomination	Domaine
Chiquila	2001	Accord	Droits fondamentaux
Marazzi	2001	Déclaration	Santé & sécurité
OTE	2001	Accord mondial	Droits fondamentaux
	2001	Brochure	Restructuration responsable
Unilever	2004	Déclaration commune	Protection des données
Skanska	2001	Accord	Droits fondamentaux
Statoil	2001	Accord	Dialogue social
Telefonica	2001	Code de conduite	Droits fondamentaux
Triumph	2001	Code de conduite	Droits fondamentaux
Sara Lee			Santé & Sécurité
Merloni	2002	Déclaration d'accord	Droits fondamentaux
Anglogold	2002	Accord	Droits sociaux fondamentaux - dialogue social
Diageo	2002	Annexe à l'accord CEE	Bonnes pratiques de restructuration
Daimler Chrysler	2002	Principes	RSE
Fonterra	2002	Accord mondial	Droits syndicaux, standards minimum
Endesa	2002	Protocole	Dialogue social
Ballast Nedam	2002	Accord cadre	Droits fondamentaux sous-traitance
Norske Skog	2002	Accord	Droits fondamentaux
GE advanced materials (GEPE)	2002	Accord	Communications électroniques
	2003	Annexe à l'accord CEE	Procédure de négociation CEE direction
	2004	Accord	Données d'embauche
Volkswagen	2002	Déclaration commune	Droits sociaux et relations sociales
Dexia	2002	Principes	Management social
Usinor-Arcelor	2002	Convention européenne	Santé & sécurité
	2004	Convention européenne avec groupes de préparation	Santé & sécurité
	2005	Groupe de préparation	Evolution des compétences
	2005	Accord mondial	RSE
Leoni	2003	Déclaration	Droits sociaux et relations sociales
Lafarge	2003	Réunions européennes et Déclaration commune	Santé & sécurité
	2005	Accord	RSF-- relations sociales
Schlumberger	2003	Commission ad-hoc	Conditions de cession d'activités
GEA	2003	Déclaration	RSh
Rheinmetall	2003	Code de conduite	RSE

ISS	2003	Lettre d'accord	Droits sociaux fondamentaux
SKF	2003	Code de conduite	Ethique, droits syndicaux
H&M	2004	Accord	Droits sociaux fondamentaux
Philips	2004	Texte écrit par management en consultation avec EWC	Gestion des restructurations
EDF	2004	Accord	RSE
Bosch	2004	Déclaration commune	RSE
Lukoil	2004	Accord mondial	Droits fondamentaux
Impregilo	2004	Accord cadre	RSE
Rhodia	2004	Accord	RSE
Porr	2004	Accord	Protection des données
Total	2004	Accord	Dialogue social, gestion prévisionnelle des emplois, restructurations
	2005	Accord européen	Egalité des chances
Prym	2004	Déclaration	Droits sociaux et relations industrielles
Renault	2004	Déclaration	Droits sociaux fondamentaux

Entreprise	Date	Dénomination	Domaine
SCA	2004	Accord	Coopération et RSE
Röchling	2004	Code de conduite	Droits sociaux fondamentaux
BMW	2005	Déclaration commune	RSE
EADS	2005	Déclaration commune (à inclure dans future renégociation CEE)	
Veidekke	2005	Accord cadre	RSE Santé & Sécurité, salaires, temps de travail
Schwan	2005	Accord cadre mondial	Droits sociaux fondamentaux